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ON THE NATURE OF NORMS: 
BIOLOGY, MORALITY, AND 
THE DISRUPTION OF ORDER 
Owen D. Jones* 
THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITU­
TION OF SOCIAL ORDER. By Francis Fukuyama. New York: The 
Free Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 354. $26 
The analysis of where norms come from is colored by the strong ideo­
logical preferences people have as to where they ought to come from. [p. 
189] 
For a long time - and through the now-quaint division of disci­
plines - morals and norms have been set apart from other behavior­
biasing phenomena. They have also been set apart from each other. 
Morals are generally ceded in full to philosophers. Norms have been 
ceded to sociologists. 
In retrospect, it is not clear why this should be so. Reality is noto­
riously impervious to taxonomy, and the axis supposedly distinguish­
ing morals from other norms is, after all, arbitrary. Moreover, 
behavior-biasing phenomena interact in important ways, making the 
study of parts - without more - just the study of parts. But one 
thing is clear. To the extent that understanding morals and norms is 
important to law, studying the two apart from other behavior-biasing 
phenomena creates a problem. 
This problem arises because of opportunity costs. Whenever a 
topic - such as morality - is both relevant to law and without a 
uniquely legal theoretical foundation, legal thinkers must rely (at least 
initially) on disciplines claiming expertise. But in a world in which the 
academy has divided reality into disciplinary slices - which, having 
once been sundered, are neither differently divisible nor easily recom­
bined - there is an ever-present risk to law of disciplinary capture. 
As, for example, when legal thinkers may too hastily elevate the pro-
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nouncements of one discipline, perhaps the one most hypertrophied or 
shouting loudest, over another. 
The costs of such disciplinary capture increase according to the 
value that foregone knowledge from another discipline would have of­
fered. And in today's world, in which knowledge accumulates at an 
ever-quickening pace, these opportunity costs climb faster than ever 
before, making each choice about where to turn for insights on human 
behavior fraught with consequence. To disciplines like law, in par­
ticular, charged with practical matters of great human importance, the 
costs of foregoing useful knowledge can be affirmatively harmful, not 
just intellectually embarrassing. 
As consumers and appliers of knowledge from other disciplines, 
legal thinkers should play - indeed should feel obligated to play - a 
far more active role in furthering interdisciplinary integration of sub­
jects relevant to law. Of course, the inevitable limits on the accumula­
tion of individual expertise make it endlessly tempting for even the 
most talented and committed interdisciplinary thinkers in the legal 
academy to mine a single disciplinary vein (economics or cognitive 
psychology, for example) to its maximum depths. There are econo­
mies of scale. And many great and useful insights can be and have 
been gained thereby. But the common isolation of our proliferated 
disciplinary mineshafts from even near neighbors often forecloses the 
important and available benefits that broad, cross-connective integra­
tion could provide. Put simply, scholars of various disciplines often 
work to solve the same problems, unaware that their efforts are 
closely paralleled by those with whom intellectual trade would yield 
mutual gains. 
Such is the case with morals and norms. To the extent that legal 
thinkers have in fact recently begun to move beyond philosophy and 
sociology for more information, they have turned primarily to eco­
nomics, psychology, and game theory. But even this happy develop­
ment remains an incomplete achievement (reflecting, as it does, a la­
tent tendency to elevate the social sciences over the life sciences, 
rather than partnering them). Behavioral biology has at least as much 
to offer to the study of morality and norms as these other disciplines, 
perhaps more. Many primatologists, behavioral ecologists, ethologists, 
neuroanatomists, and behavioral geneticists have long studied the ori­
gins of and patterns in, for example, human and nonhuman coopera­
tion and altruism, reciprocity and hostility, division of labor, sharing of 
production, and identification and treatment of cheaters on social 
norms. Their work has sound theoretical foundations, and is empiri­
cally robust. Without the contributions of behavioral biologists to the 
study of morals and norms, legal thinkers risk errors that are harmful, 
not just intellectually embarrassing. 
Why can we state this with confidence? Because: a) law is funda­
mentally about levering human behavior in directions it might not go 
2074 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2072 
on its own; b) law's fulcrum in this effort is its model of where behav­
ior comes from; and c) behavior is fundamentally a biological phe­
nomenon. Consequently, any model of behavior inconsistent with the 
foundations of modern behavioral biology is inaccurate and obsolete. 
(Or else the unheralded ferment of a true intellectual and scientific 
revolution.) And thus legal approaches to understanding and influ­
encing human behavior that are based on outdated behavioral models 
are simply less likely to effect socially and legally desirable outcomes 
than might be the case if the behavioral models were more conceptu­
ally robust. 
This should hardly be surprising. The centrality of biology to un­
derstanding human behavior is not just a matter of academic accesso­
rizing. Biology is not just another "and" at the "Law and--" buffet, 
to be sampled at convenience, when tastes turn. Biology is truly foun­
dational, having both broad and practical relevance at a completely 
different level of analysis than, say, economics or sociology. For just 
as theories of chemistry must be consistent, in the end, with theories of 
physics - and theories of biology must be consistent, in turn, with 
theories of chemistry and physics - theories of economics, sociology, 
psychology, philosophy, anthropology, and all the rest must be consis­
tent, in the end, with the basic principles of biology. 
The most basic principle of biology, in turn, is evolution - par­
ticularly evolution by natural selection. Natural selection occurs in 
any system in which there is differential reproductive success as a 
function of heritable variation. Put simply, any population of replica­
tors, in which variations in heritable traits affect future replicative suc­
cess, will tend, over generations, to accumulate an increasing propor­
tion of traits that contribute to replicative success.1 
The power of this deceptively simple insight - and its ultimate 
relevance to law - lies in its ability to explain not only species-typical 
patterns of form, but also species-typical patterns of behavior. (Or 
what some people term a species-typical nature.) More specifically, 
natural selection shapes the physical and chemical information­
processing pathways of the brain in ways that have tended, over time, 
to contribute to the survival and reproductive success of organisms 
that bear them. These information-processing pathways yield behav­
ioral predispositions. Of which, to circle back, morals and norms are a 
subset. 
Francis Fukuyama understands all this.2 He has written an exu­
berantly creative, thorough, and highly stimulating book on the rela­
tionship between political and economic order on one hand, and social 
1. See generally sources cited infra note 27. 
2. Francis Fukuyama is the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at 
George Mason University. 
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and moral order, on the other. Specifically, he argues that under­
standing the human future requires us to see underappreciated con­
nections between politics, economics, law, social order, morals, norms, 
and biology. It is a big task. For Fukuyama undertakes nothing less, 
in The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of 
Social Order, than to identify recent patterns in social order and dis­
order, to offer novel explanations for their origins, and to make pre­
dictions about what will happen next. But Fukuyama has never been 
one to shy away from big tasks. (His prior works include, for example, 
the ambitiously titled The End of History and the Last Man.3) And in 
The Great Disruption, true to his subtitle, Fukuyama ambitiously en­
lists the life sciences, integrating them with social sciences, in aid of a 
deeper understanding of human behavior and morality, and in fur­
therance of political science analysis.4 His message is synthetic, ex­
planatory, predictive, and in the end, consoling. His methods are, for 
legal thinkers and others, engaging, instructive, and sometimes cau­
tioning. 
I. CONTEXT 
Fukuyama's major hurdle, in arguing for the relevance of life sci­
ence perspectives on human morality, is context. His contextual 
problem extends past disciplinary divisions to the history of science 
itself. Beyond the endlessly important but by now cliche observation 
that bad things have been done in the name of good science, lies an 
even deeper resistance to his effort. For we can view the march of the 
science he invokes as, in many ways, leading a steady retreat from 
human uniqueness. 
Time and again, through history, we have developed a perfectly 
plausible way of viewing our place on the planet. It comports with our 
preferences for the way the world ought sensibly to operate. It con­
forms to our convictions. It makes us feel special in the dark danger­
ous night. And then along comes some flag-waver like Fukuyama, 
preaching the scientific virtues of parsimony and falsification, who 
shoots our favored theories full of holes. Constructive or destructive? 
It depends on where you happen to be standing at the time. Progress 
is less preferable when progress threatens prominence. 
3. FRANCIS F'uKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
Fukuyama's subsequent book, TRUST: THE S OCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY (1995), provides an equally ambitious argument that trust is the underappreci­
ated linchpin of economic prosperity. 
4. His efforts in this regard parallel that of legal thinkers, employing evolutionary analy­
sis in law, who enlist life science perspectives in furtherance of existing legal goals. For in­
formation on the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL), see <http://www. 
sealsite.org>. For sources exploring the utility to law of integrating biological perspectives, 
see infra note 27. 
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And science has, one must admit, served up steady threats to our 
prominence. When Copernican reasoning ultimately exposed as false 
our belief that Earth was the physical center of everything, we re­
treated to the less bold claim that at least, and after all, we among all 
life sprang full-blown from time, in full modern form, as the direct, 
special, and unchanged-from-the-beginning creation of a supernatural 
power. Theoretically possible - until Darwin shrank the probability 
toward zero. 
Thereafter, we retreated into successively more humble claims to 
uniqueness.5 First, we were the only tool users. But that didn't work.6 
Then we restaked the boundaries of uniqueness, imagining that we 
and we alone were capable of culture - the intergenerational and 
non-genetic transmission of novel information or forms of behavior. 
But that has proved to be equally incorrect.7 Our latest, perhaps last, 
retreat therefore stakes the once imperialistic boundaries of human 
uniqueness ever closer to home - surgically dividing the moral from 
the amoral, with us in one camp, and all other life in another. If the 
physicists, chemists, biologists, anatomists, paleontologists, and as­
tronomers can provide us few comforts in an expansive human 
uniqueness, then surely the philosophers can afford us safe and sole 
haven within moraled walls. 
Francis Fukuyama apparently does not think so. For he grounds 
his argument, in The Great Disruption, on theory and evidence that 
modern human morality reflects the relentless influence of natural se­
lection. 8 He is not the first to argue that morality cannot be fully un-
5. All species are unique, of course, by definition. But we have generally preferred to 
believe, pace Orwell, that some species are more unique than others, and that our own 
uniqueness is - well - unique. 
6. Species as diverse as chimpanzees and crows have demonstrated the abilities not only 
to use tools, but to fashion them from raw materials. See, e.g., Yukimaru Sugiyama, Tool 
Use by Wild Chimpanzees, 367 NATURE 327 (1994); Gavin R. Hunt, Manufacture and Use of 
Hook-Tools by New Caledonian Crows, 379 NATURE 249 {1996). 
7. A recent study addressing all accumulated reports of chimpanzee cultural transmis­
sion made patent that we are not alone within the boundaries we have staked (at least so 
long as we avoid conveniently ad hoc definitions of culture that might require, for example, 
the painting of still lifes in acrylic). See Frans B. M. de Waal, Cultural Primatology Comes of 
Age, 399 NATURE 635 {1999); A. Whiten et al., Cultures in Chimpanzees, 399 NATURE 682 
(1999). 
8. To be sure, it is a grand mistake to think (as many apparently do) that the biology of 
behavior is about genes for this behavior or that, present in some portion of the population 
and absent elsewhere. As will be discussed further below, cutting edge behavioral biology 
incorporates far more important, far subtler, far more flexible, and far less reductionistic 
influences on behavior than that. Nonetheless, population-wide patterns in moral senti­
ments are predictably consistent with the knowable effects of evolutionary processes on the 
human mind. As Arnhart puts it, "Human beings have a natural moral sense that emerges 
as a joint product of moral emotions such as sympathy and anger and moral principles such 
as kinship and reciprocity," as a function of evolutionary history. LARRY ARNHART, 
DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT: THE BIOLOGICAL ETHICS OF HUMAN NATURE 7 (1998). 
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derstood without a biological foundation (as he would be the first to 
point out).9 But where Fukuyama makes important original contribu­
tions is in his willingness to explore several possible implications, for 
tomorrow's questions about the human future, of evolution's effects 
on human morality. This Review will discuss the principal implica­
tions Fukuyama sees, and suggest several others in the legal arena. 
What are morals, after all, but information-processing patterns that tend to bias behavior 
in this way rather than that way? If those information-processing patterns tend to bias be­
havior in similar ways, on average, across a species, in contexts likely to be long encountered 
throughout evolutionary history, they are likely to be the subject of selection pressures, 
which favor some outcomes more than others, and thus favor psychological mechanisms 
leading to adaptive responses more than others. To the extent these are even slightly herita­
ble, the historically more adaptive psychological predispositions will tend to predominate 
over the less adaptive ones. 
For a discussion of recent work attempting to locate moral information processing 
within particular portions of the human brain, see, for example, Steven W. Anderson et al., 
Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal 
Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032 (1999); and Raymond J. Dolan, On the Neurology 
of Morals, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 927 (1999). 
9. Fukuyama is preceded by many evolutionists. Among the sources that consider the 
relationship between biology and morality are RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF 
MORAL SYSTEMS (1987); RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 
(1979); ARNHART, supra note 8; BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS (Jane 
Maienschein & Michael Ruse eds., 1999); DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 
(1991); CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (1871); DANIEL C. DENNETI, 
DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE (1995); FRANS B. 
M. DE W AAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND 
OTHER ANIMALS (1996); EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS (Matthew H. Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki 
eds., 1993); INVESTIGATING THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN MORALITY 
(James P. Hurd ed., 1996); ROBERT J. McSHEA, MORALITY AND HUMAN NATURE: A NEW 
ROUTE TO ETHICAL THEORY (1990); OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter & Roger D. Masters eds., 1986); LEWIS PETRINOVICH, 
HUMAN EVOLUTION, REPRODUCTION, AND MORALITY 25 (1995); RICHARD POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999); G.E. PUGH, THE BIOLOGICAL 
ORIGIN OF HUMAN VALUES (1977); RJ. RICHARDS, DARWIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR (1989); MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS 
OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996); MICHAEL 
RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY: A NATURALISTIC APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY 
(1998); THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger D. Masters & 
Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993); ROBERT 
WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
(1994); C.J. Cela-Conde, The Challenge of Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 293 
(1986); Dennis L. Krebs, The Evolution of Moral Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS (Charles Crawford ed., 
1998); Roger D. Masters, Evolutionary Biology and Natural Right: Leo Strauss, Natural Sci­
ence and Political Philosophy, in THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A STRAUSSIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 49 (Kenneth Deutsch & Walter Soffer eds., 1987, corrected edition); RJ. 
Richards, A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 265 (1986); Michael Ruse 
& Edward 0. Wilson, Moral Philosophy as Applied Science, 61 PHIL. 173 (1986); R. Trigg, 
Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 325 (1986); Edward 0. Wilson, The Biological 
Basis of Morality, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 53 (April 1998). For concise overviews of the re­
surgent interest in the influence of biology on human morality, see Jane Maienschein & 
Michael Ruse, Introduction, in BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS, supra, at 1, and 
Phillip R. Sloan, From Natural Law to Evolutionary Ethics in Enlightenment French Natural 
History, in BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS, supra, at 52; WRIGHT, supra, at 
327-44. 
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In Fukuyama's view, maintaining social order in the face of tech­
nological and economic change is one of the greatest challenges facing 
information age democracies today (p. 10). Fukuyama's main con­
cern, in helping us to face this challenge, is that we bridge disciplines 
and understand not only the sources of social disorder but also the 
processes by which social order is reconstituted. Those "renorming" 
processes include, he argues, not only the traditional and better­
known forms of hierarchical, top-down norm creation, from govern­
mental, religious, and community authorities, but also spontaneous, 
bottom-up renorming, which bubbles up independently of hierarchical 
impositions. 
Developing this argument requires, and Fukuyama provides, an 
extended look at the relationship between hierarchical (formal) and 
spontaneous (informal) sources of order. It is here, in arguing for the 
probability, existence, and importance of spontaneous renorming, that 
Fukuyama draws not only on history and economics, but also on evo­
lutionary biology, and biologically informed approaches to psychology 
and anthropology. 
The book is significant for lawyers for three reasons. First, legal 
policymakers are, in part, in the business of combating social disorder; 
so a deeper understanding of both its multiple causes and the multiple 
ways in which order is reestablished may aid their efforts. Second, the 
work complements and extends recent legal scholarship that addresses 
the importance, origin, and development of norms (as the result of 
self-organization and sometimes surprising decisions of decentralized 
individuals10) and also addresses the centrality, to an understanding of 
10. See, e.g., Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); 
Symposium, Law and the Legal Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1998); Symposium, The Le­
gal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 
V AND. L. REV. 1497 (1998); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic 
Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. (1998). A small sampling of the burgeoning literature 
includes Lisa Bernstein, SOCIAL NORMS AND DEFAULT RULES ANALYSIS, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993); Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory: Thickening the 
"Self' in "Self-Interest" in SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES IN CONTEXT (D. J. Galilean ed., 1995); 
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis 
of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 153 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); Robert C. 
Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 {1998); 
Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms 
and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994); Christine Jolls, Behavioral 
Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 V AND. L. REV. 1653 {1998); Christine 
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); 
Russell Korobkin, Inertia And Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power 
of Default Rules And Form Terms, 51 V AND. L. REV. 1583 {1998); Bailey Kuklin, Evolution, 
Politics, and Law (March 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A 
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and So­
cial Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Develop-
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norms, of game-theoretic analyses of how selfish interests can bring 
cooperative outcomes.11 Third, the book usefully demonstrates, in a 
political science parallel to law, ways in which the tools of behavioral 
biology are both accessible to non-biologists, and useful in their aca­
demic enterprises. In that demonstration, there are a number of im­
portant lessons, taken up in Part IV below. 
Fukuyama has three main points, reflected in the three main Parts 
of his book. In Part One, entitled "The Great Disruption," Fukuyama 
argues that the transition from the industrial age to the information 
age has been a mixed blessing. Specifically, when mental labor in­
creasingly displaced physical labor, and services began to displace 
manufacturing as a source of wealth, this adversely affected our social 
relations and moral lives (pp. 3-4). For example, inexpensive informa­
tion technology leads both to an increase in individualism and to the 
"miniaturization of community" (p. 91). It "erodes the boundaries of 
long-established cultural communities" with cheap but relentless tele­
vision, radio, fax, and e-mail (p. 3), and it decreases meaningful, long­
term, and truly engaged associations between people (pp. 5-6). As 
Fukuyama puts it, "The same innovation that increases productivity or 
launches a new industry undermines an existing community or makes 
an entire way of life obsolete" (p. 282). 
This, in turn, increases social disorder. Or relatedly, as Fukuyama 
prefers to frame it, this causes a decline in social capital.12 Social capi­
tal, the neglected cousin of physical capital (such as machines) and 
human capital (such as know-how), is the set of informal values or 
norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation 
ment, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, Law, Eco­
nomics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 V AND. L. REV. 1541 (1998); 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law 
and the Pricing of Credit, 51 V AND. L. REV. 1679 (1998); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Loss Aversion 
and Involuntary Transfers of Title, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral 
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of 
Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 V AND. L. REV. 1747 (1998). On the self-organization of 
complexity in Jaw, see generally J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dy­
namical Law-and-Society System· A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern 
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Com­
plexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for 
Democracy, 49 V AND. L. REV. 1407 (1996). 
11. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Ap­
proach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997); JACK HIRSHLEIFER, 
Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, in 
ECONOMIC BERA VIOUR IN ADVERSITY 211-73 (1987). 
12. A brief history of the coinage and changing applications of the term appears on pp. 
19-20. 
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among them.13 Such norms include, for example, reliability, honesty, 
and reciprocity.14 The "Great Disruption," of the book's title, is 
Fukuyama's term for the dramatic (and in his view largely negative) 
changes in social values, between roughly the mid 1960s and the early 
1990s, that both reflected and contributed to a sharp, contemporane­
ous decline in social capital (p. 4). 
Of course, empirically tracing fluctuations in social capital is no 
simple task. Fukuyama attempts to estimate changes in the supply of 
social capital, across several decades, by advancing a variety of posi­
tive and negative measures.15 For the former, he uses data from sur­
veys on the subjects of trust, values, and civil society, which correlate 
positively with the presence of social capital. For the latter, he princi­
pally employs data from national statistical agencies chronicling tradi­
tional indicators of social dysfunction. These track and evidence, he 
argues, the comparative absence of social capital. Such indicators in­
clude increased crime, decline of kinship as a source of social cohe­
sion, decline in fertility, decline in the institution of marriage, in­
creased illegitimacy, and the decline in trust - both privately (trust 
placed in individuals) and publicly (trust afforded institutions ).16 The 
data suggest that total social capital indeed declined between the 
1960s and the 1990s, and that it did so more rapidly than it had during 
earlier periods of shifting norms.17 
13. P. 16. In other words, as Fukuyama explains, social capital can be variously under­
stood to be: the subset of norms that constitutes society's stock of shared values, p. 14; a co­
operative norm that has become embedded in the relationships among a group of people, 
pp. 27-28; and informal norms promoting cooperative behavior, p. 28. Thus, families, for 
example, are an important source of social capital. Pp. 16-17. James Coleman, the sociolo­
gist who is most responsible for bringing the term social capital into broader use, defined it 
as "the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organization 
and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child." P. 36 (citing JAMES S. 
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300 (1990)). 
14. As Fukuyama illustrates: 
If members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then 
they will come to trust one another. Trust is like a lubricant that makes the running of any 
group or organization more efficient .... Trust is a key by-product of the cooperative social 
norms that constitute social capital. If people can be counted on to keep commitments, 
honor norms of reciprocity, and avoid opportunistic behavior then groups will form more 
readily and those that do form will be able to achieve common purposes more efficiently. 
Pp. 16,49. 
15. His analysis is anything but parochial. He examines data not only from the United 
States, but also from the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Japan, as well as Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Norway, Finland, and 
Korea. See, e.g., pp. 27-60. 
16. Fukuyama reconciles the apparent overall decline in trust and community with data 
suggesting an overall increase in group membership by arguing that the "radius of trust" has 
shortened, and the number of people within one's community circle has lowered, yielding a 
net decline. P. 88. 
17. A discussion of methods appears on pp. 20-24. Fukuyama finds that, starting in 
roughly 1965, virtually all developed countries experienced a simultaneous and rapid up­
swing in negative measures of social capital. P. 27. Crime rates in the United States, for ex-
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Apparently, this matters. Declining social capital is bad, 
Fukuyama argues, not simply because cooperation is normatively nice, 
but because the kinds of cooperation social capital fosters are eco­
nomically efficient. Specifically, social capital increases aggregate 
economic wealth by facilitating gains from trade, as individuals con­
tract more with those parties with whom they share norms than they 
do with others.18 Social capital is therefore critical to a successful 
economy. So critical is social capital, in fact, that Fukuyama describes 
it as a prerequisite not only for all forms of group endeavor in a mod­
ern society but for civil democratic society itself.19 
In Part Two of the book, entitled "On the Genealogy of Morals," 
Fukuyama essentially addresses the question: If social capital is both 
crucial and declining, can it be reestablished and preserved, and if so, 
by what process? This inquiry requires him to explore, at some length, 
the sources of order in human society. A great many who have 
thought on the subject of this question apparently tend to believe that 
the reconstitution of social order is possible exclusively or primarily 
through hierarchical authoritarian interventions from political and re­
ligious spheres of influence (p. 6). 
In contrast, Fukuyama argues that social order, once disrupted, 
tends to be reconstituted, even in the absence of hierarchically im­
posed interventions, such as laws, regulations, holy texts, or bureau­
cratic organization charts. Capitalist societies are not destined to be­
come morally poorer as they become materially wealthier.2° For social 
ample, declined slightly in the mid-1980s and then jumped up again in the late 1980s, peak­
ing around 1991-92. P. 31. And this same pattern is evident in nearly all other non-Asian 
developed countries. P. 31. Because families are an important source of social capital, the 
dramatic shifts in social norms concerning reproduction and gender relations, specifically the 
pill-induced sexual revolution, the rise of feminism in the 1960s and the 1970s, falling mar­
riage rates, and increasing divorce and illegitimacy rates "introduced massive changes not 
just in households but in offices, factories, neighborhoods, voluntary associations, education, 
even the military. " P. 36; see also pp. 92-111. 
18. As Fukuyama puts it: 
[S]ocial capital produces wealth and is therefore of economic value to a national !!COn­
omy . . . .  [It enables individuals to] amplify their own power and abilities by following co­
operative rules that constrain their freedom of choice, allow them to communicate with oth­
ers, and coordinate their actions. Social virtues like honesty, reciprocity, and keeping 
commitments are not choice worthy just as ethical values; they also have a tangible dollar 
value and help the groups who practice them achieve shared ends. 
P. 14. 
19. Pp. 14, 20. Here Fukuyama follows the influential views of Putnam. See Robert D. 
Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. OF DEMOCRACY 65 {1995) 
{although the seeds of the idea are in de Tocqueville). Putnam has helped generate a large 
literature in both political and legal scholarship, in which questions of civil society, "civic 
republicanism, " and communitarianism currently form a major theme. Almost none of this 
literature (apart from Fukuyama) pays attention to the evolved psychology of social rela­
tions, which any attempts to "reinvigorate" civic participation inevitably must engage and 
use. 
20. For Fukuyama, it is technological change that disrupts social order, not capitalism 
itself. In his view, capitalism, while both a source of disorder and order, is probably a net 
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order can and will emerge spontaneously, even in the most technologi­
cally sophisticated parts of the global economy, as a bottom-up phe­
nomenon - as a function of informal, unpublished, evolving norms in 
communities. 
This obtains, Fukuyama argues, for two reasons, both revealed in 
the light of disciplinary integration. First, our species-typical human 
psychology is intrinsically predisposed, by biological heritage, to cre­
ate moral rules and cooperative social order.21 This follows from the 
predictable effects of evolutionary processes on inclinations that his­
torically yielded individual advantage through the mutual gains social 
interaction can afford. The adaptive advantage these inclinations pro­
vided leave us psychologically uncomfortable when social order is dis­
rupted.22 There is therefore a dynamic interplay between the erosion 
of norms and the process of renorming, as reconstitution springs from 
our innate human nature to seek cooperation and moral rules that 
bind us together in ways often facilitating mutual gain. Second, we are 
also by nature rational, and rational calculation will make us realize 
the value of cooperation, prompting us to be, in fact, more coopera­
tive. In three chapters at the heart of the book - Eight, Nine, and 
Ten - Fukuyama roots each of these two reasons (one less cognitive, 
the other more so) in modern evolutionary biology, having described 
the study of how order arises from self-organization as "one of the 
most interesting and important intellectual developments of our time" 
{p. 6). 
To be sure, Fukuyama does not claim that spontaneous order can 
solve all collective action problems. And his discussions of the limits 
of spontaneous order, when hierarchical interventions are necessary to 
increase and maintain social capital, are among the most intellectually 
honest (if necessarily untidy) parts of the book (Chapter 13). But the 
fact that hierarchically imposed norms are often necessary does not 
undermine Fukuyama's principal point: spontaneous sources of norms 
are far more important to our understanding of human norms, and to 
the maintenance of a thriving economy, than previously accepted.23 
generator of norms. The very thing that makes capitalism thrive - self-interest - leads to 
cooperation. See, e.g., pp. 253, 261-62. 
21. "Human beings by nature are social creatures with certain built-in, natural capabili­
ties for solving problems of social cooperation and inventing more rules to constrain individ­
ual choice." P. 231; see also p. 137. 
22. This argument is summarized most succinctly on p. 6. See also p. 137 {"The situation 
of normlessness - what Durkheim labeled anomie - is intensely uncomfortable for us, and 
we will seek to create new rules to replace the ones that have been undercut. If technology 
makes certain old forms of community difficult to sustain, then we will seek out new ones, 
and we will use our reason to negotiate different arrangements that will suit our underlying 
interests, needs, and passions."). 
23. For a discussion on how the presence of spontaneous renorming processes can pro­
vide an emotional basis for the development and maintenance of hierarchical institutions 
specialized in norm-making, see infra Section III.D. 
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These spontaneous sources of norms, Fukuyama claims, could theo­
retically help to counteract the Great Disruption of social norms (and 
thus social capital) occasioned by the transition from the industrial age 
to the information age. 
In Part Three of the book, entitled "The Great Reconstruction," 
Fukuyama assesses the extent to which that theoretical possibility is 
probable. He argues that understanding how evolutionary processes 
have affected human behavior affords us some comfort in predicting 
that humankind will adapt to disruption with reconstitution, and that a 
healthy and stable social order will once again emerge. 
Thus, the good news is that the social disruption is not here to stay, 
as the inevitable end of the Enlightenment, secular humanism, capi­
talism, and the like. Social and moral disorder is reversible through 
renorming processes. The bad news is that the reversal is not strictly 
inevitable (p. 282). For while "decentralized groups of people will 
tend to produce order if left to their own devices" (p. 253), this is a 
tendency, not an inevitability. 
Fukuyama argues that successful and beneficial renorming proc­
esses involve not only the spontaneous renorming of a species predis­
posed to renorm, but also, ideally, two parallel effects. These include 
the effects of hierarchical impositions (such as state police powers and 
religious admonishments) as well as the efforts of rational individuals 
who, having recognized that their communal lives have deteriorated, 
"work actively to renorm their society through discussion, argument, 
cultural argument, and even culture wars" (p. 250). That is, at the 
same time that Fukuyama argues that spontaneous sources of order 
are probable, he also argues that we cannot passively rely on sponta­
neous renorming alone. There are still (many readers will be relieved 
to learn) important roles for careful public planning and hierarchical 
renorming. Specifically: "Rational hierarchical authority, in the form 
of government and formal law, will have to serve as supplements .... 
State authority in the form of formal law will always be a necessary 
complement and corrective . . .  to the extended order of human coop­
eration."24 
Fortunately, argues Fukuyama, the early stages of reconstitution 
are already visible today. Fukuyama notes, for example, that rates of 
24. P. 221. Discussing the probable persistence of hierarchical sources of order even in 
informal networks, Fukuyama states: 
We can argue that networks will become more important in the technological world of the 
future and yet concede that there are at least three reasons why hierarchy will remain a nec­
essary part of organization for the foreseeable future. First, we cannot take the existence of 
networks and their underlying social capital for granted, and where they don't exist, hierar­
chy may be the only possible form of organization. Second, hierarchy is often functionally 
necessary for organizations to achieve their goals. And third, people by nature like to or­
ganize themselves hierarchically. 
P.222. 
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increase in crime, divorce, illegitimacy, and distrust have reversed or 
slowed substantially, particularly in the United States, but also in 
many of the other countries he identifies as having experienced sharp 
increases in social disorder in the 1960s (p. 271). He sees these data as 
evidence that "the Great Disruption has run its course and that the 
process of renorming has already begun" (p. 271 ). And, because in­
ternalized rules and norms of behavior are preconditions of successful 
reconstitution, Fukuyama predicts that "the world of the twenty-first 
century will depend heavily on such informal norms" (p. 7). We will 
see this in human organizations that show less reliance on formal hier­
archies and more reliance on the shared values inherent in informal 
networks. 
III. LESSONS AND CHALLENGES 
The Great Disruption is forcefully written, original, and engaging. 
The tackled topic - predicting the social contours of the full informa­
tion age society-is important. By raising and confronting the ques­
tions of how we can maintain and increase social capital in an in­
creasingly fractured social world, Fukuyama identifies problems, the 
implications of which we may not have fully recognized, and tenders a 
framework for thinking about and confronting them. His book pro­
vides us not only with an interesting theory to explain recent disrup­
tions in social order, but also with a better sense of the processes by 
which social capital - a key component of social order - is created 
and maintained. 
One of the questions that I think the book does not squarely con­
front, however, concerns the issue of net effects. That is, we now 
know that technological change, for all the benefits it offers, can 
prompt declines in valuable social capital, thereby imposing costs. 
Fukuyama clearly considers these costs, were they to remain unreme­
died, unacceptable.25 But remedies - replenishing social capital -
also cost, presumably. Is there no point at which the magnitude of the 
gains from technology simply outweighs the costs, even if some quan­
tum of lost social capital were never replenished? 
While I am confident that Fukuyama has important things to say 
about this question, it still remains a question. But it is not the kind of 
question on which I wish to focus here. In my view, the real signifi­
cance of the book is more in its method than its substance. Behavioral 
biology is the linchpin of Fukuyama's analysis, and of increasing im­
portance in the legal arena, and it is therefore on Fukuyama's use of 
biology that I wish to concentrate. 
25. After all, to label something a "Disruption" is, I think, to offer a value judgment 
rather than a mere description, identifying a normatively bad interference with what had 
previously been better. 
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Fukuyama has a clear vision of the importance of integrating life 
and social science perspectives into public policy analysis. But he does 
more, in this book, than simply turn to the evolutionary sciences (such 
as ethology, primatology, behavioral biology, evolutionary psychology, 
and evolutionary anthropology) for insights into human morality and 
future social ordering. He goes beyond integration and boldly at­
tempts application, in the context of some very pressing issues. And 
this works better in some instances than in others.26 
Fukuyama's invocations of biology reflect a current and sophisti­
cated familiarity (to which the notes to Chapters 9 and 10, in particu­
lar, attest). He gives a broad and readable account of basic principles 
in modern evolutionary biology, drawing knowledgeably, for example, 
on the works of leading primatologists, such as Frans de Waal and 
Richard Wrangham. He neatly integrates accounts of the supplanta­
tion, by William Hamilton's and George Williams's theories, of earlier 
theories of group selection and the origins of altruistic behavior (p. 
161). He provides explanations for the counterintuitive propositions 
that the self-serving orientation of genes will often lead to genuinely 
cooperative, sometimes even "altruistic," forms of behavior. And, to 
make the argument from biology comprehensible, he provides a com­
petent and engaging survey of topics ranging from natural selection, 
sexual selection, and kin selection, on one hand, to cooperation and 
reciprocal altruism, on the other. 
This is not easy to do, particularly in a comparatively short space, 
but Fukuyama does it rather well.27 It is one of his great strengths that 
26. It bears emphasis that Fukuyama's approach is a sharp break from prevailing as­
sumptions that philosophy and psychology can, either alone or in concert, provide adequate 
explanation for human morality and norms. It is also a sharp break from the recent trend to 
use game theoretic models of competing norms, analyzed solely at the cultural level of 
transmission, to explain dominant ones. It is an argument for both the utility and centrality 
of evolutionary theory in understanding complex human phenomena. 
27. Pp. 154-86. For introductions to these subjects written explicitly for lawyers, see 
Timothy H. Goldsmith & Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A Brief 
Overview and Some Important Concepts, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 131 (1999) (addressing core 
principles of behavioral biology); Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Intro­
duction and Application to Child Abuse, 15 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1126-57 (1997) (Part I offers 
"A Primer in Law-Relevant Evolutionary Biology"); Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology: 
Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 167 (1997) (dis­
cussing integration of life science and social science perspectives); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Cul­
ture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 81 CAL. L. REV. 827, 
841-53 (1999) (addressing core principles of behavioral biology). 
Book-length popular accounts of behavioral biology include MATI RIDLEY, THE RED 
QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUITON OF HUMAN NATURE (1994) and ROBERT WRIGHT, 
THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUITONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 55-107 
{1994). Accessible textbooks include JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLU­
TIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); DAVID Buss, EVOLUITONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE 
NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (1999); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, 
BIOLOGY, EVOLUITON, AND HUMAN NATURE (forthcoming 2000); ROBERT TR!VERS, 
SOCIALEVOLUITON {1985). 
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he sees the large-scale connectedness between historically separated 
aspects of the human condition. For example, he understands and 
manages to convey why there are biological bases to social emotions 
generally, and to moral sentiments and rule-following specifically.28 
Moreover, he weaves into his discussion information concerning the 
biological bases for status seeking, anger, guilt, pride, shame, jealousy, 
love of children, and the like.29 He sees the deep commonalities be­
tween biological and economic reasoning, without naively supposing 
that these are without significant points of departure.30 He sees the in­
fluence of biology on family relationships.31 And, most significantly, 
he has a manifest awareness of the centrality of evolutionary theory in 
putting all of this in a coherent perspective. 
There are a number of different lessons in this approach. The first 
lesson is that one cannot think accurately and comprehensively about 
important issues of human behavior without some sense of the histori­
cal, evolutionary contexts in which that behavior plays out. Period. 
To attempt otherwise is as silly as trying to explain modern geopoliti­
cal boundaries without any attention to history. The past shapes the 
present and constrains the future. To the extent that law is fundamen­
tally about shifting human behavior in directions it might not other­
wise go, the more historically accurate and contextualized framework 
that biology affords may help us to pursue our legal policies more effi­
ciently. 
Second, the general moral sentiments, including shame, guilt, sen­
sitivity to injustice, a taste for reciprocity, and moralistic aggression, 
are rooted (like other emotions, such as sexual attraction and jealousy, 
love of offspring, distaste for incest and rape, and anger) in 
information-processing pathways that natural selection has influ­
enced.32 To the extent that morality and emotions are relevant to law, 
28. See, e.g., pp. 149, 175-79, 184-85. For more on these topics, see Owen D. Jones, Law, 
Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 283 (1999). 
29. See, e.g., p. 184. 
30. See pp. 161-62 (describing both "methodological borrowing" and differences be­
tween the fields). Richard Posner has explored a number of intportant connections between 
biological and economic reasoning. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992), 
where he observes that "there are illuminating analytical parallels between the biological 
and economic approaches . . .  tne two approaches are mutually reinforcing and may in com­
bination constitute a more powerful theory than either by itself. " Id. at 88. The economist 
Jack Hirshleifer was aµiong the first to observe the potential for integrating biological and 
economic insights. See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, Economics from a Biological Viewpoint, 20 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1977). And Paul Rubin, among others, continues in this important tradi­
tion. See, e.g., Paul Rubin, The State of Nature and the Evollltion of Political Preferences, 3 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. {forthcoming 2001). 
31. See, e.g., pp. 95-101 (describing biological underpinnings of family). 
32. Darwin essentially argued this in The Descent of Man. See DARWIN, supra note 9, 
chs. 3, 5. It is interesting to note that John Rawls, in Theory of Justice, also speculated that 
there may be evolutionary origins to his basic claints about moral principles. JOHN RAWLS, 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 502-03 (1971). 
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the further study of biobehavioral influences on their pan-human, 
nonrandom patterns will provide a richer understanding of the recip­
rocal relationship between morality, culture, and law. 
Third, integrating biology into discussions of politics, law, and 
other complex human behaviors is, while highly useful, at times ex­
tremely challenging. The following Sections describe four of these 
challenges. 
A. The Non-Normativeness of Norms 
One of the most challenging aspects of discussing the relevance of 
behavioral biology to human behavior, and particularly to morality 
and norms, is to leave norms out of it. By that, I mean that one must 
simultaneously acknowledge the evolutionary influences on the form 
and content of norms, and avoid concluding that the norms themselves 
are normatively good or bad, on the basis of biology alone. 
Put another way: explanation is not justification, and description is 
not prescription. The realms of the descriptive "is" and the normative 
"ought" are logically separate. To combine them is to commit what is 
known as the Naturalistic Fallacy - arguing that what is is what ought 
to be.33 (Committing this error gave Social Darwinists - forever - an 
aptly deserved bad name, as they misappropriated Darwinian ideas, 
and argued that the upper classes were upper by merit, and deserved 
to remain there, by biology.) The results of biological processes can­
not be described as good or bad without identifying and injecting a 
value outside biology that makes us think them so. For example, we 
now have a great deal of information concerning biobehavioral influ­
ences on sexual aggression and on child abuse.34 But that need never 
lead us to conclude that sexual aggression or child abuse are permissi­
ble. 35 
33. The term was coined in G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 62, 89-110 (Thomas 
Baldwin ed., 2d ed. 1993), but the concept traces to the 1888 edition of DAVID HUME, A 
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978). 
The reciprocal and less recognized error is the one more commonly committed. One com­
mits the Moralistic Fallacy whenever one attempts to reason (usually implicitly rather than 
explicitly): that the way something ought to be is the way that it is; that explanation follows 
inclination; and that facts follow preferences. For discussion of the Moralistic Fallacy, see 
Charles Crawford, The Theory of Evolution in the Study of Human Behaviour: An Intro­
duction and Overview, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES 
AND APPLICATIONS 9 (Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998); Jones, Sex, Culture, 
and the Biology of Rape, supra note 27, at 893-95; Charles Crawford, Book Review, 20 
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 139 (1999) (reviewing Uniting Psychology and Biology: 
Integrative Perspectives on Human Development). 
34. See, e.g., Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 27; Jones, Sex, Culture, 
and the Biology of Rape, supra note 27. 
35. We could, therefore, maintain that the descriptive and normative realms are to be 
held completely separate. Of course, the matter is considerably more complicated than that. 
When we have a normative goal to change behavior, that goal is furthered by greater knowl­
edge of the pathways by which the behavior arises. So much is clear. Less clear is the point, 
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Fukuyama meets this challenge of disentangling is from ought and 
demonstrates it is possible to invoke biology without claiming that 
what is biological is necessarily good. While he happens to believe 
that our evolved predispositions toward cooperation are good, it is be­
cause he values (not surprisingly) the effects of such cooperation on 
the economy and political order. Thus, it is because he values effi­
ciency, increases in wealth, and political, civil, and democratic stability 
that he finds the particular biological predispositions to which he re­
fers to be fortunate. This is not at all the same thing as claiming (as 
some critics incorrectly presume that those who invoke biology auto­
matically claim) that all biological predispositions are fortunate, sim­
ply because they have evolved. 
B. Adapting to Adaptation 
A second challenge to future discussions of the biology of human 
psychological predispositions concerns the nature of adaptation. It 
turns out that it is not a simple matter to differentiate adaptations 
from by-products of adaptations.36 This is hard enough when biolo­
gists examine anatomy, but it is particularly difficult when animal psy­
chology is involved. Information-processing patterns are not easily 
observable, they interact with one another, and they often include, in 
any event, nested algorithms sensitive to variations in environmental 
stimuli. But it is even more difficult to predict how given human psy­
chological adaptations will play out in the future. 
Fukuyama predicts, for example, that humans will successfully re­
norm, in a way that preserves social capital, because evolutionary pro­
cesses have rendered normlessness uncomfortable for us, and have left 
us psychologically predisposed to cooperate and solve collective action 
problems. While I share the author's hope for a successful and renor­
med human future, I am not yet persuaded that biology affords us 
quite the degree of confidence that Fukuyama thinks it does. For ex­
ample, in Fukuyama's view: 
[K]nowing that there are important natural and spontaneous sources of 
social order is not a minor insight. It suggests that culture and moral val­
ues will continue to evolve in ways that will allow people to adapt to the 
which some have argued, that while the "is" does not strictly dictate the "ought," it may be 
inefficient and silly to generate an ought without some working knowledge of even poten­
tially surmountable constraints on the "is." For example, Lewis Petrinovich argues that 
"The nature of what is should be understood as a factor to enable us to frame the ought in 
better terms." PETRINOVICH, supra note 9, at 25. This line of reasoning (how can you have 
anything but wildly irrational values if you are ignorant of facts) is also explored in 
DENNETI, supra note 9, at 467-68. 
36. An adaptation is a heritable feature of an organism enabling it to survive, and to 
increase the copies of its genes that appear in the next generation, in its natural environ­
ment, better than if it lacked the feature. 
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changing technological and economic conditions they face and that this 
spontaneous evolution will interact with hierarchical authority to pro­
duce an 'extended order of human cooperation' . . . .  [W]e should pre­
sume that people will continue to use their innate capabilities and reason 
to evolve rules that serve their long-term interests and needs. [p. 244] 
I am certain that Fukuyama is not arguing that reason alone, or 
evolved behavioral predispositions alone, are sufficient to guarantee 
or nearly guarantee a successful future. But I am equally certain that 
Fukuyama is arguing that our evolved behavioral predispositions very 
significantly increase the probability that such a future will obtain. I'm 
not sure this is right. I find it more difficult than Fukuyama does to 
conclude that knowledge of evolutionary processes affords us comfort 
in believing that humankind is very likely to meet the challenges of 
technological change.37 
I have four reasons for reservation. First, 99.9% of all species that 
ever lived are extinct.38 Presumably, many of them were well-adapted 
to their environments before some external change changed every­
thing. The odds are against the long-term persistence of any species, 
let alone one as young and volatile as our own, encountering novel 
changes of our own creation, that we generate faster than generations. 
Second, evolutionary processes adapt species to previously pre­
vailing, not future, environments. True, we are a species for whom 
behavio.ral adaptability (or "plasticity") is itself an evolved adaptation. 
We are more adaptable than many other species, and our adaptability 
flows principally from the powerful cognitive capacities that enable us 
to crunch more data, in more sophisticated and nuanced fashion, than 
other creatures. So, to the extent that thinking hard about the present 
and future can help us turn the present into a viable future, our cogni­
tive abilities may help us secure some endlessly renormed future. But 
this much we already knew. The optimism Fukuyama offers comes 
from the hope that our current brains are already up to future chal­
lenges, not from the confidence that natural selection will somehow 
shape our brains to successfully meet future challenges. 
The distinction is important. We know that natural selection can­
not design future-looking adaptations. The process is, after all, a 
mindless one - without foresight by definition. Natural selection ap­
pears never to have designed, nor do biologists expect it ever can de­
sign, an all-purpose adaptability mechanism designed to ensure adap­
tation to current or future social or technological change, when then­
prevailing conditions differ from ancestral ones, in which current ad-
37. To be sure, Fukuyama is not naive enough to think that anything "guarantees that 
there will be upturns in the cycle [of social order]." P. 282 (emphasis added). A quite dis­
tinct optimism, however, just shy of confidence, pervades the book. 
38. See DAVID RAUP, EXTINCTION: BAD GENES OR BAD LUCK? 3-4 (1991) (reporting 
the estimate). 
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aptations were designed. To the extent that features of our species or 
others function well in current environments, it is either because the 
environments have not changed materially from the environments in 
which those features evolved, or because those features, which were 
adaptive in ancestral environments for one reason, tum out also to be 
adaptive in a different, current environment for another. 
Third, the animal kingdom provides daily examples of adaptations 
that run aground on environmental changes. Moths do circle lamp­
lights, because the moon and stars used to provide reliable reference 
points for navigation. Squirrels vocally harass hunters, whose guns af­
ford novel ways of killing them. People overconsume highly caloric 
foods, which contairi energy concentrations never before encountered 
in nature. And humans continue to be sexually attracted to (and 
sexually jealous of) people they know are (and perhaps want to be) 
using contraception. An adaptation is only as good as the environ­
ment in which it continues to provide advantage - and historical ad­
aptations can, during environmental shifts, prove downright deleteri­
ous.39 Some of the evolved predispositions we manifest, therefore, 
such as aggressive responses to threats to status, may decrease the 
probability of a secure future precisely because they encounter novel 
technological features, from street-common handguns to interconti­
nental ballistic missiles. 
Fourth, if our human psychology turns out not to be well-adapted 
to the technological environment we are creating for ourselves, we 
know that natural selection is unlikely to yield responsive adaptations 
anytime soon. Soon, by evolutionary standards, is measured in gen­
erations, which for humans are rather long, compared with the rapid­
ity of technological changes. For the distribution within a population 
to manifest a "new" trait soon, a heritable trait must have arisen 
(through mutation or genetic recombination), and it must provide -
in the then existing environment - a very pronounced reproductive 
advantage over alternative traits contemporaneously existing.40 Such 
circumstances are generally rare, but even more so for a species like 
ours with small brood size. 
39. This can lead to something I refer to as "time shifted rationality" (to distinguish it 
from "bounded rationality") - the temporal mismatch of historically adaptive behavior and 
modern environments. See Owen D. Jones, Law, Behavioral Economics, and Evolution, 
Paper presented at The Olin Conference: Evolution and Legal Theory, Georgetown 
University Law Center (April 16, 1999), and the Annual Scholarship Conference of the 
Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (Sept. 24, 1999) (on file with author). 
40. For an example of the strength of selection pressures necessary to cause speedy 
changes in morphology, see Jonathan B. Losos et al., Contingency and Determinism in Repli­
cated Adaptive Radiations of Island Lizards, 279 SCIENCE 2115 (1998); Gretchen Vogel, For 
Island Lizards, History Repeats Itself, 279 SCIENCE 2043 (1998). 
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C. Our Dispositions Toward Predispositions 
A third challenge concerns the subtle interactions of genes and en­
vironment. Fukuyama is far too sophisticated to put stock in the ri­
diculous notion that there can ever be a meaningful discussion of 
whether a given behavior is exclusively the province of nature or of 
nurture.41 This is like debating whether the area of a rectangle is the 
product of its length or its width. All biological processes, including 
normal brain development, ultimately depend on rich environmental 
inputs. Similarly, all environmental influences can only be perceived, 
sorted, analyzed, and understood through biological, evolved proc­
esses. 
At the same time, Fukuyama recognizes that the influence of bio­
behavioral predispositions is more direct, and can be spoken of more 
meaningfully, in the contexts of some behaviors than others. (Com­
pare extremes: sexual behavior, for example, on one hand, with filing 
an SEC disclosure statement, on the other.) This has led to a ten­
dency, presumably in the interests of verbal economy, for Fukuyama 
to refer to some behaviors as being under "genetic rather than cultural 
control,"42 or as being "determined not by culture but by biology."43 
I think this tendency is, though understandable, unfortunate for 
two reasons. First, the use of the words "control" and "determined" 
- rather than variations of the word "influence," for example - may 
inadvertently reinforce the rnisperception that behavioral biology is 
about genetic determinism. A reader who has not attempted to keep 
pace with the explosion of modern biology literature, as Fukuyama 
has, might fairly recoil from the impression that some significant num­
ber of complex, non-reflex human behaviors are simply unavoidable. 
Second, by using language of mutual exclusivity (controlled by x 
"rather than" y; determined "not by [x] but by [y]") Fukuyama over­
dichotomizes in a way few biologists would sanction.44 Again, this may 
confuse readers. 
41. See, e.g., p. 158 (discussing the interplay of nature and nurture). 
42. The author describes how a variety of mother-infant interactions "appear to be un­
der genetic rather than cultural control" P. 96. See also pp. 158-59, 165. 
43. P. 158 ("so too may human cultures reflect common social requirements detennined 
not by culture but by biology"). 
44. For another example, see p. 187 ("[T]he particular norms and metanorms chosen by 
a given group of individuals are cultural choice, not a product of nature."). I think the dis­
tinction Fukuyama wants to draw here is not between culture and biology (or nature), but 
rather between cultural vectors of trait transmission and genetic vectors of trait transmission, 
both of which are biological Culture is best considered as a fully integrated part of our biol­
ogy - both in the sense that culture reflects natural selection's influence on the human 
brain, and also in the sense that cultural practices reciprocally affect human breeding pat­
terns, and thus contribute to selection pressures that ultimately affect the spread of heritable 
human psychological predispositions. 
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Fukuyama somewhat underemphasizes, I believe, three things he 
knows, but that writers on human behavioral biology could probably 
and usefully make greater efforts to underscore. First, a predisposi­
tion is not a predetermination. One of the advantages of our large 
brain is that it can accommodate a very wide and highly nuanced 
range of inclinations - which by measures both large and tiny can in­
crease or decrease the probabilities of various behaviors, in the face of 
various circumstances. Second, biobehavioral predispositions are gen­
erally condition-dependent (that is, context-specific), not automatic.45 
Third, and this point underscores the second, we are talking, in all of 
this, about the evolved psychology aspect of behavioral biology, not 
the behavioral genetics aspect. 
The distinction is important, and rarely explicit. Behavioral ge­
netics involves efforts to trace the different behaviors of different in­
dividuals to genetic differences among them. (This is what most peo­
ple, incorrectly, think discussions of human behavioral biology are 
about.) In contrast, the complementary aspect of behavioral biology, 
concerning evolved or "species-typical" psychology, attempts to trace 
many of the different behaviors of different individuals not to differ­
ent versions of genes, but rather to different environmental stimuli en­
countered by neurologically similar brains, sporting similar, evolved, 
and contingent decisional algorithms. That is, humans bear species­
wide (in some cases sex-wide) physical, information-processing com­
monalities that have evolved to yield predispositions toward certain 
behaviors in the face of certain categories and confluences of stimuli, 
and predispositions toward other behaviors in other contexts. 
D. Reasons for Rationality 
A fourth challenge, and perhaps the one most crucial for the law at 
present, concerns the relationship between rationality, its supposed 
opposites, and biology. There are times, in The Great Disruption, 
when Fukuyama describes both sociality and rationality as products of 
human nature.46 That is, he does acknowledge, in places, that ration-
45. This means that co=on psychological predispositions can sometimes underlie even 
cultural differences among groups, which may be the result of those predispositions proc­
essing materially different environmental circumstances. Contrast: 
One of the weaknesses of any attempt to use human nature to explain phenomena like trust 
and social capital is that it cannot give an account of the observable differences that exist be­
tween human groups. And so too here. The kinds of universal psychological characteristics 
described earlier as the basis for social capital are sufficient to explain why there should be 
social cooperation within relatively small groups, but they do not explain why different con­
temporary human societies have different radii of trust. These kinds of explanations must be 
entirely cultural in nature, and often need to refer back to a society's religious heritage. 
P. 240. 
46. For example: 
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ality is itself a function of our biology. He is not consistent in this, 
however. Fukuyama's approach generally demonstrates an apparent 
preference for sorting behaviors on a continuum bounded by the bio­
logically influenced, at one end, and the rationally influenced, at the 
other.47 In these contexts, the rational pathway to behavior is some­
how distinct from the biological pathway to behavior. It is clear why 
Fukuyama wants to draw this distinction. He is attempting to con­
struct a useful taxonomy that attends to differences in the extent to 
which given behaviors are rationally chosen. But I do think the dis­
tinction, as framed, is a bit misleading. 
Of course, there are at least two different meanings to rational. 
One describes a process of cognitive decisionmaking. The other de­
scribes the substantive end product behavior, judged by a standard ir­
respective of the process by which that behavior was generated. 
(Much ink has been spilled by authors using mismatched meanings, 
such that rational processes can lead to irrational outcomes, and irra­
tional processes can lead to rational outcomes.) But, whichever one of 
these two common meanings Fukuyama intends (I think it is the 
process-based former), it seems likely that Fukuyama over-separates 
the rational from the biological. 
The biological/rational distinction only makes sense if the rational 
is not itself importantly biological. But of course it is. Rationality, as 
a process, is not just trivially biological, in the sense that thinking and 
decisionmaking happen to take place in living tissue with chemical 
needs and electrical outputs. Rationality is importantly biological in 
the sense that the structure of the brain is believed to contain features 
evolved to facilitate precisely the kind of multiple-variable, context­
specific, calculus that increases the probability of the most adaptive 
[H]uman beings are by nature social creatures, whose most basic drives and instincts lead 
them to create moral rules that bind themselves together into communities. They are also by 
nature rational, and their rationality allows them to create ways of cooperating with one an­
other spontaneously. 
P. 6. 
47. For example: 
What we find is that order and social capital have two broad bases of support. The first is 
biological, and emerges from human nature itself. There have been important recent ad­
vances in the life sciences, which have the cumulative effect of reestablishing the classical 
view that human nature exists and that their nature makes humans social and political crea­
tures with great capabilities for establishing social rules. While this research in a certain 
sense does not tell us anything that Aristotle didn't know, it allows us to be much more pre­
cise about the nature of human sociability and what is and is not rooted in the human ge­
nome. The second basis of support for social order is human reason, and reason's ability to 
spontaneously generate solutions to problems of social cooperation. 
P. 138. See also pp. 152-53, figs. 8.3 & 8.4; p. 249 ("[H]uman beings will produce moral rules 
for themselves, partly because they are designed by nature to do so and partly as a result of 
their pursuit of self-interest."); p. 273 {"People are social animals by nature and, in addition, 
rational creators of cultural rules. Both nature and rationality ultimately support the devel­
opment of the ordinary virtues like honesty, reliability, and reciprocity that constitute the 
basis for social capital."). 
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behavioral response.48 The brain's ability and tendency to calculate is 
an evolved capability, in the same way that the breast's ability to yield 
milk after birth is an evolved capability. Neither is more "biological" 
than the other in this broad but basic sense. Both are species-typical 
aspects of ways in which genes pass themselves from one generation to 
the next. 
Similarly, for rationality as outcome, the brain of our species tends 
to yield rational conclusions (in many, but not all, circumstances) be­
cause ancestral individuals whose heritable brain design tended to 
yield irrational conclusions tended to behave in irrational ways. By 
definition, such behavior leads to individual disadvantage, and hence 
(typically) to reproductive disadvantage. That, over time, leads to 
proportionally fewer brains with a predisposition toward irrational 
preferences (which, we must remember, vastly outnumber rational 
preferences at every moment in time). 
This leads me to conclude two things. First, that Fukuyama might 
have done better to label the antipode of rational causation emotional 
(rather than "biological") causation. Second, that Fukuyama might 
fruitfully have framed both the rational and the emotional within the 
biological. This second conclusion would afford biology a broader and 
more scientifically accurate role, and it would avoid over-cabining 
biological influences in the quadrant of Fukuyama's analysis in which 
only arational, spontaneous sources of order emerge. It would also 
highlight the deep connectedness between emotional and rational be­
havior, which in the end strengthens, in my view, many of Fukuyama's 
most interesting points. 
In Chapter 8, Fukuyama offers an original, two-axis, four-quadrant 
framework for plotting sources of order (p. 152, fig. 8.3). 
48. See generally THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
GENERATION OF CULTURE (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby eds., 1992). The alternative in­
cludes context-insensitive decisional rules that are adaptive only on average. For example, a 
lemming swims across water. Most Jemmings encountering water encounter streams, ponds, 
rivers, or lakes - which are swimmable and may afford new foraging opportunities on the 
other side. Sometimes the water is an ocean. But the behavioral predisposition is context­
insensitive, leading to the unfortunate demise of many - but importantly not all - Jem­
mings. For those who survive the statistically more frequent swims across shorter bodies of 
water, a swimming predisposition is still more adaptive, on average, than never swimming, 
and therefore such a species-typical predisposition can persist. 
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FIGURE 8.3: SOURCES OF ORDER 
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One axis spans from rational to arational sources of order. The bi­
secting axis spans from hierarchically generated sources of order to 
spontaneously generated sources of order. There are a variety of self­
evident advantages to this framework. One of the disadvantages is 
that it sometimes obscures quite important relationships between dif­
ferent quadrants. For example, it can be interpreted to suggest that 
rational, hierarchically generated sources of order, including written 
constitutions, "formal law," and other consciously-constructed, top­
down impositions of order are not significantly biologically influenced. 
Fukuyama locates incest taboos within the arational, spontaneously 
generated, "biologically grounded" norms. At the same time, it is 
clear that the opposite quadrant contains formal laws written to pro­
scribe incest. Are these not also biologically influenced, as a function 
of the well-documented maladaptiveness of breeding between close 
relatives, and the adaptive moral repugnance that typically prevents 
it?49 The content of a norm in the hierarchical rational quadrant can 
be strongly influenced by the content of a biobehavioral predisposition 
evolved as a function of natural selection.50 
49. For discussion of the evolution of incest aversion, see ROBIN Fox, THE RED LAMP 
OF INCEST (rev. ed. 1983); Debra Lieberman & Donald Symons, Sibling Incest Avoidance: 
From Westermarck to Wolf, 73 Q. REV. OFBIO. 463 (1999). 
50. The Uniform Commercial Code, which presumably occupies a position in the 
"hierarchical/rational" quadrant of Fukuyama's framework, states that "[e]very contract or 
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." 
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). The force of the requirement is underscored by the fact that, in con­
trast to most other provisions of the Code, it cannot be waived by either party or otherwise 
contracted around. Although it requires some speculation, it seems probable that such a 
provision reflects one end result of natural selection's operation on predispositions con-
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Fukuyama is clearly too sophisticated to believe that the quadrants 
are not intimately connected. Yet an emphasis on the inevitability 
of their interrelationship is neither highlighted nor explored. 
Fukuyama's structure causes readers to stop just short of making one 
of the most important points about formal law: many of its patterns 
reflect biologically influenced behavioral, moral, and emotional pre­
dispositions. Similarly, the two other quadrants of Fukuyama's 
framework, involving arational hierarchically generated sources of or­
der, such as religions, and rational spontaneously generated sources of 
order, such as the common law, are imbued with biological influences 
on human morality and thus on behavioral predispositions. {Anyone 
who believes that religious proscriptions of sexual behavior or the 
common law's accommodation of crimes of passion do not reflect 
natural selection's operation on human emotions and tastes needs to 
think a bit longer.) 
Framing rationality and emotionality as close cousins, as I sug­
gested above, rather than as wholly different sources of behavior, re­
quires taking two giant steps back. From this vantage, one can see the 
rational and emotional capabilities of the brain as merely varied mani­
festations of a single aspect of brain function. This aspect has evolved 
to solve one problem in a variety of different ways. The problem is: 
how to increase the proportion of copies of one's genes that appear in 
the next generation. That overarching problem is subdivisible, 
loosely, into a variety of different kinds of challenges. Some chal­
lenges require nutritional provisioning. Others require identifying and 
attracting a suitable sexual partner. Some require the ability to iden­
tify and avoid life-threatening injuries. Others require the sort of in­
group maneuvering for advantage that we label political. 
The remarkable thing about the human brain is that it has evolved 
to solve these different challenges by associating some kinds of envi­
ronmental stimuli with some kinds of motivational mechanisms (e.g., 
the more visceral emotional pathways), and other kinds of stimuli with 
other kinds of motivational mechanisms (e.g., the more consciously 
analytical pathways). For example, there are some circumstances 
posing sufficiently grave threats, with historically effective options so 
limited, that conscious analysis can be dispensed with entirely. Under 
these circumstances, an appropriate physiological response can be di­
rected, immediately following perception, by parts of the brain spe-
cerning cooperative interactions, which operation tended to yield sharp moralistic reactions 
to "bad faith" (i.e., cheating) acts by defectors from cooperative undertakings. The evolved 
emotion toward cheaters likely led to a social norm, which led in tum to customary trade 
practices (lex mercatoria), some of which were imported to the common law, and later 
codified. Thus, the existence and content of the norm in the hierarchical/rational quadrant 
may derive from sources of social order in the spontaneous/arational quadrant, via the 
spontaneous/rational quadrant. 
May 2000] On the Nature of Norms 2097 
cializing in non-deliberative decisionmaking. That is, the behavior of 
the body is removed from rational control. 
For instance, in moments of grave physical danger, the brain does 
not route the question of appropriate response to the rational calcula­
tor. Instead, it automatically increases heart rate and respiration. It 
ensures that adrenaline is secreted by adrenal glands, which natural 
selection has favored for performing precisely this function. And it 
temporarily redirects energy away from digestive, reproductive, and 
other postponable operations, making more energy available for 
physical maneuvering, such as flight. In addition, it yanks the con­
scious brain into directing its full and focused attention on a threat 
perceived elsewhere in the brain and not yet routed through the ra­
tional calculator. What we call fear is the aggregated physiological re­
sponses the brain directs as a result of evolutionary processes making 
this way of generating behavior more likely to result in adaptive re­
sponse to environmental challenges than many other ways of gener­
ating behavior. 
A more pointed (if somewhat graphic) example: men do not say 
Hmmm. I observe that my wife is having intercourse with another man. 
This is a breach of contract. It may yield an offspring, not mine, that by 
law I must care for and pay for as if it were. That is likely to be more 
costly, over time, than would be my effort to stop it. Hence, I should in­
tervene. "Excuse me . . . . " 
The raw absurdity of processing this sort of information through a ra­
tional calculator is not lost on natural selection, which routes the in­
formation in an entirely different way. That is, it is not purely because 
we have learned to be jealous that we are jealous. What we call jeal­
ousy is a state of the nervous system that we can identify only because 
it increases the probability of behaviors that we take to be consistent 
with sexual or emotional proprietariness.51 Tue adaptive value of 
those behaviors, in ancestral environments, served to preserve the 
propensity to respond to infidelity with the information-processing 
predisposition that increases the probability of those behaviors. 
The main point, though, is that emotional and rational approaches, 
as well as every combination of emotional and rational approaches in 
between, are all meaningfully biological. Tuey reflect the effects of 
natural selection on the brain's ability to generate the appropriate be­
haviors for the appropriate circumstances.52 Natural selection gives to 
the rational calculator what tends to belong there. That does not, 
51. On the evolution of jealousy, see DAVID M. Buss, THE DANGEROUS PASSION: 
WHY JEALOUSY IS AS NECESSARY AS LOVE AND SEX (2000) and DAVID M. Buss, THE 
EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING (1994). 
52. For an interesting discussion of how emotions also function, adaptively, as credible 
pre-commitment devices, see ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRA­
TEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988). 
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however, render the workings or product of the rational calculator any 
less meaningfully biological than emotions. And seeing the deep con­
nectedness between the two may help us to avoid the same sort of 
over-division that our balkanized disciplines reflect. 
IV. LEGAL !MPLICATIONS 
What are the key legal implications of this line of reasoning? At 
the most general level, a biologically-informed approach to law - an 
evolutionary analysis in law - can help to refine behavioral models; 
generate new legal strategies, improve cost-benefit analyses, and point 
directions for future research.s3 In the specific contexts of morals and 
norms, there are several specific implications. 
A principal utility of evolutionary analysis in law can be summed 
up in two words: universal acid.s4 Evolutionary analysis helps to dis­
solve intellectual untenability. No theory of mind, no theory of be­
havior, no theory of culture, and no theory of rational or irrational be­
havior can long stand if it is inconsistent with the way natural selection 
has shaped the information-processing, behavior-biasing patterns of 
brain function. It is certainly true, of course, that not everything in 
modem ethics can be properly thought to emerge inevitably from 
naturalistic sources. Nonetheless, evolutionary analysis prevents us 
from telling stories to ourselves about where morality comes from that 
are inconsistent with scientific knowledge about how the human brain 
came to be the way it is. Just as no theory of flight can be inconsistent, 
in the end, with the theory of gravity, no theory of human behavior, 
morality, or norms, no matter how seemingly transcendent, can be in­
consistent with the process of evolution.ss 
With the underbrush of untenable theories thinned, evolutionary 
analysis next reveals under-recognized relationships between all the 
behavioral subjects of law's interest. It plays connect-the-dots with 
morals, norms, emotions, rationalities, irrationalities, tastes for risk; 
and the like, making a coherent picture from an otherwise insuffi­
ciently coherent assemblage of data points. Just as the relationship 
between the numbers 105, 30, and 2000 cannot be fully appreciated 
without reference to multiples of 5, the lowest common denominator, 
seemingly disparate human behaviors can be neither fully appreciated 
53. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 27, at 1226-41. 
54. Dennett introduced the metaphor of evolutionary perspectives as universal acid in 
DENNETI, supra note 9, at 61-84. 
55. This is not to say that evolutionary theory is categorically beyond scientific chal­
lenge. No scientific theory ever is. It is to say, however, that the evolutionary sciences are 
far more empirically and theoretically robust than current alternatives, and that any persua­
sive theory of norm formulation (for example) that is inconsistent with them bears the heavy 
burden of replacing them with a more accurate and systematically coherent theory. 
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nor reconciled without reference to psychological and generative 
commonalities most visible in the light of evolutionary analysis. 
In short, evolutionary analysis provides a deeper, more accurate, 
more contextualized, and more nuanced framework for understanding 
the interplay between various psychological predispositions influenc­
ing behavior relevant to law. Its window on the mind opens a view on 
human behavior as the product of a brain that evolutionary processes 
have functionally specialized to perceive and process information in 
ways that tended to yield adaptive solutions to problems encountered 
in ancestral environments of evolutionary adaptation. This, in turn, 
yields at least three implications. 
The first implication is that some norms of behavior relevant to 
law evolve not simply because they are more efficient than others, but 
because they are more appealing to the human brain than others - as 
a function of their effects in deep ancestral environments. Evolution­
ary analysis reveals the under-credited influence of visceral emotions 
\vith narrowly-tailored evolutionary significance on rational reflection 
and moral sentiments, from empathy to moralistic aggression.56 Mor­
alistic outrage at having been cheated by someone, for example, or at 
seeing someone else being cheated, can be seen to be no less a biologi­
cal adaptation than our thumbs. The inquiry into what makes moral 
behavior feel good and immoral behavior feel bad (in broad brush) is 
analogous in important ways to investigating what makes sugar taste 
sweet and cardboard taste bad. (Answer: the former is an evolved, 
species-typical perception that biases eating behavior toward sources 
rich in energy usable by human physiology.) Once this is recognized, 
it is but a short step to resolving many otherwise seemingly puzzling 
preferences (for spiteful litigation, for example) or supposed irration­
alities. These are sometimes, undoubtedly, the modern manifestations 
of historically adaptive psychological predispositions that are, in 
much-changed current environments, maladaptive. That they may 
lead us to seemingly irrational behavior in a novel environment does 
not make them inherently irrational or inexplicable.57 
A second implication is that evolutionary analysis provides an en­
tirely new tool of legal history. Because human brains, as a function of 
evolutionary processes, must inevitably share some historically adap­
tive information-processing pathways (emotions, moral fundaments, 
norms, and the like) that bias behavior, we would expect to see the 
imprints of these on human legal systems, cross-culturally. And, in 
56. Richard Posner begins to explore the relevance of this in POSNER, supra note 9 (at 
33-35. As an example, Amy Wax argues that an evolutionary perspective on reciprocity 
norms is useful in helping us understand public attitudes about welfare p�ograms. See Amy 
Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political 
Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming summer 2000). 
57. See Jones, supra note 39. 
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fact, we do, although we rarely acknowledge the connection between 
evolutionary processes and legal artifacts. This is not to suggest, of 
course, that either the specific substance of law (say, the estate tax 
rate) or the specific procedure (of probating a will, for example) are 
directly traceable to psychological predispositions toward those pre­
cise legal requirements. It is to suggest that the general sentiments at 
the root of many human legal manifestations - and of our concep­
tions of law itself - are non-random. 
It is not coin-flipping odds, for example, how the legal systems 
tend to provide that the property of an intestate decedent will flow 
(i.e., to relatives by marriage and blood, in priority according to de­
grees of consanguinity). Nor is the very notion of property coherent 
without reference to evolved psychological predispositions to acquire 
and use, or to share with some and exclude others. An evolutionary 
analysis - attending to ancestral effects of variations in normative re­
actions - helps explain why, for example, within all known human 
cultures, rape is proscribed to a degree disproportionate to other 
forms of physical harm that do not implicate reproductive capacities.58 
Just as history can provide important context for understanding geo­
political boundaries, and the future behavior of states, evolutionary 
analysis can provide important context for understanding the legal 
landscape, and the ways in which it may develop in the future. We will 
miss something important if we fail to see the connection between 
biologically influenced norms and the existence of, content of, and 
support for legal systems. 
A third implication concerns efforts to predict variations in the ef­
fectiveness of different efforts to move human behavior with the tools 
of law. At the moment, we have neither a comprehensive nor a par­
ticularly accurate theory to explain why and predict when people will 
conform to certain legal prescriptions more than to others. Econom­
ics, certainly, helps us understand that, in many cases, people will be­
have as if they are cost-benefit maximizers of personal utility. But 
economics, alone, provides neither a basis for understanding why per­
sonal utility has the content it does (that is, it has no predictive theory 
of what people's tastes will be), nor a basis for predicting the strong 
emotional content to much human behavior relevant to law. Neither 
psychology nor sociology, unsupplemented by behavioral biology, can 
suffice to remedy this shortcoming. Evolutionary analysis can help. 
For example, it seems to me that a principle derivable from biol­
ogy, which might usefully be termed The Law of Law's Leverage, can 
provide tangible purchase for efforts to explain and predict those as-
58. See Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Preven­
tion, supra note 27; Owen D. Jones, Law, Biology, and Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 151 (2000). 
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pects of human behavior that will be most sensitive and least sensitive 
to changes in legal rules. It consists of two symmetrical propositions.59 
Proposition One: The cost of using law to reduce the inci­
dence of any behavior will correlate positively with the 
extent to which that behavior was adaptive for its bear­
ers, on average, in the relevant environment of evolu­
tionary adaptation. 
Proposition Two: The cost of using law to increase the inci­
dence of any behavior will correlate negatively with the 
extent to which that behavior was adaptive for its bear­
ers, on average, in the relevant environment of evolu­
tionary adaptation. 
This Law of Law's Leverage predicts, for example, that it will gen­
erally be less costly to shift a behavior in ways that tended to increase 
reproductive success in ancestral environments than it will be to shift 
behavior in ways that tended to decrease reproductive success in an­
cestral environments. The malleability of a behavior in reaction to 
changes in law - and therefore, to a great extent, the commensurate 
cost of trying to change the behavior - will tend to vary as a function 
of the extent to which the behavior was historically adaptive. Put an­
other way, the slope of the demand curve for historically adaptive be­
havior that is now deemed to be socially (in some cases even individu­
ally) undesirable will be far steeper (reflecting less sensitivity to price) 
than the corresponding slope for behavior that was comparatively less 
adaptive in ancestral environments. Importantly, this rule will tend to 
hold, even when the costs that an individual actually and foreseeably 
incurs in behaving in a historically adaptive way exceed the presently 
foreseeable benefits of such behavior.60 
CONCLUSION 
Like the man who searches for lost keys only under the lamppost, 
because the light is better there, modem disciplines have tended to fo­
cus their efforts to understand human behavior on uniquely human 
cultural processes - because they are readily observable. Law has 
followed suit. But while the uniqueness of our species is obvious, it is 
neither physically nor behaviorally absolute. Relentlessly abrasive, 
59. I suppose I could combine these into one rule. But clarity recommended bifurca­
tion, at least for the time being. 
60. This idea is explored at greater length in Jones, Law, Behavioral Economics, and 
Evolution, supra note 39. Legal contexts in which the Law of Law's Leverage will be par­
ticularly relevant will be those aspects of, for example, constitutional law, criminal law, fam­
ily law, torts, property, and contracts that involve such things as: mating, fairness, homicide; 
child-rearing, status-seeking, property and territory, resource accumulation, sexuality (in­
cluding infidelity and jealousy), speech, privacy, empathy, and crimes of passion. 
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systematic, and (emphatically) knowable evolutionary processes have 
wrought in us, as in all other animals, a behavioral repertoire of pre­
dispositions. That natural selection has afforded our brain unparal­
leled self-consciousness and rational ability should not obscure the un­
avoidable conclusion that our fundamental emotions, moralities, 
norms, and predilections - many of which underlie behavior of criti­
cal importance to law - often reflect adaptations to deep ancestral 
environments and conditions. 
Against this background, The Great Disruption provides something 
far more significant than simply arguing for the importance of social 
capital to a thriving economy, and the importance of reconstituting so­
cial order as we move from an industrial to information age society. 
(Though those, themselves, are observations worth careful study.) By 
exploring how predispositions toward social order can evolve, The 
Great Disruption provides a valuable example of how integrating 
evolutionary perspectives on human brain and behavior can further 
the analysis of important social and political problems. Because so 
much of that integration focuses on the evolution of human moral sen­
timents, and because an understanding of morality is central to compe­
tent legal thinking, The Great Disruption therefore offers law some 
important insights. 
For example, we should be asking not whether our moral senti­
ments could have been influenced by evolutionary history, but how it 
could be otherwise. Morality cannot simply be some arbitrary cultural 
artifact that happened to gain a foothold because some tabula-rasa 
human mind, in some socio-cultural milieu, invented it. Nor are our 
morals and norms the glorious and deduced end product of objectively 
indisputable ratiocinations. For whatever else they may be, morals 
and norms are fundamentally subsets of human behavioral predisposi­
tions, which are in turn a product of human information-processing 
patterns, which are in tum a function of human brain structure, which 
is in tum a product of evolutionary processes. This has a variety of 
implications for the way we think, not only about the relationship be­
tween law and morality, but also about the relationship between law 
and behavior. 
Viewed in this light it is clear that morals and norms can remain 
divorced from biology through only the most artificial and disciplinar­
ily jealous, xenophobic, and acontextual machinations. While it would 
be absurd to imagine that biology could alone provide a complete ex­
planation for human moral behavior, it is no less equally absurd to 
imagine that moral behavior can be understood, in any deep way, 
without knowledge of the pathways and principles by which the 
information-processing, behavior-biasing patterns of the human brain 
came, through knowable evolutionary processes, to be as they are. An 
extreme view? Hardly. Science knows of no way by which it could be 
otherwise. Extremity is defined by the contrary assumption: that the 
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brain has somehow evolved beyond the reach of the evolutionary pro­
cesses that built it. It is therefore mistaken and misleading, maybe 
more, to champion any theory of human norm or morality formation 
independent of the effects of evolution on the human brain. 
Francis Fukuyama clearly sees all this. He raises some interesting 
questions about the implications, and offers some answers. And while 
I don't find all of them persuasive, I am persuaded that he is on the 
right track, and that legal thinkers should pay attention to the rich op­
portunities evolutionary analysis holds for their own discipline. 
